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ABSTRACT: This article questions traditional experimental approaches to the study of primate cognition. Because of a 
widespread assumption that cognition in non-human primates is genetically encoded and “natural,” these 
approaches neglect how profoundly apes’ cultural rearing experiences affect test results. We describe how 
three advanced cognitive abilities – imitation, theory of mind and language – emerged in bonobos maturing 
in a bi-species Pan/Homo culture, and how individual rearing differences led to individual forms of these 
abilities. These descriptions are taken from a rich ethnographic material, and we argue for the scientific su-
periority of participant-based ethnographic studies of primate cognition in shared Pan/Homo cultures. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we further develop our investigations into the ways in which Pan/Homo 
cultural living alters the development of the cognitive capacities of great apes. At this 
juncture we focus our analysis on the following three arenas:  
(i) imitation 
(ii) theory of mind 
(iii) language.1  
1. Animal culture 
Culture has often been viewed as that which distinguishes humans from animals 
(Povinelli, 2000, Tomasello, 1999, 2003). This view is more common among human-
ists than among biologists (Boesch, 1999: Savage-Rumbaugh, Williams, Furuichi, and 
Kano, 1996). Many psychologists, for instance, assume that while humans live mean-
ingfully in shared cultures developed and maintained in collaboration, animals move 
instinctively and alone in environments. As such they cannot interpret in causal or 
mental terms; this is also held to be true for the highly social and intelligent great apes 
(Donald 2001, Povinelli 2000), though some psychologists have steadfastly disagreed 
(Rumbaugh, 2003). While cultural psychologists such as Bruner (1990) consider hu-
man cognition as a capacity formed by culture in early childhood, they perceive chim-
panzee cognition as determined by genetic factors with limited ability for cultural in-
fluence (Tomasello 1999). 
                                                     
1 Due to the limited space available for the papers on this collection, the rich material contained in the 
footnotes of this paper have been deleted: more than 2,000 words. Yet they can be found among the 
stuff available in the Great Ape Trust website: GreatApeTrust.com. 
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 In the past decades, however, animal culture has become a subject of empirical 
biological research (for an overview, see Bonner 1980, de Waal 2001). Biologists now 
study how animals learn from each other, and how ways of life are transmitted cultur-
ally and not just genetically (see Boesch 1991, Guinet & Bouvier 1995, Whiten et al. 
1999). Rather than discovering animal-like traits in humans, as early sociobiologists 
did (e.g., Wilson 1978), biologists now reveal humanlike traits in animals. 
 In this paper, we offer a new view on this opposition between psychologists and 
biologists. Our view is not the classic one of studying what is ‘out there’ according to 
one or another disciplinary perspective. Rather our view has been hewn out of our 
own study of how human culture changes cognition in great apes, specifically, a group 
of eight bonobos who have been subjects of our cultural and linguistic investigations 
since 1975 (Savage-Rumbaugh, Bakeman and Wilkerson, 1977; Segerdahl, Fields, and 
Savage-Rumbaugh, 2005). 
 Traditionally, scientists have attempted to explicate ape cognition through system-
atic experiments designed to determine if apes are able to exhibit, and/or can be 
trained to produce, various skills thought to be indicative of particular levels of psy-
chological functioning. A fundamental epistemological flaw mars this work. It is a well 
known fact that ‘normal’ psychological functioning in human individuals results from 
a lengthy rearing and enculturation process which involves parents, relatives, peers, 
and formal educational experiences. Without the benefit of such experiences, human 
children do not thrive, nor do they perform well on tests of psychological functioning. 
Implicit in tests of ape cognition lies an unstated and unproven assumption: namely 
that ape cognition differs from human cognition in that it will remain inherently lim-
ited regardless of the ape’s cultural rearing environment. This implicit assumption 
leads scientists to conclude that tests of different apes from widely different back-
grounds should produce similar findings as long as the apes are relatively ‘normal’ 
(meaning they are not obviously mentally demented). However, it remains the case 
that most of the individual apes on which psychologists base their conclusions have 
been raised in groups of wild-caught orphaned apes, or born in captivity and reared in 
nurseries and other environments lacking a cultural web.  
 By contrast, we argue that different Pan/Homo cultures should produce predictably 
different results. Moreover, imitation should occur spontaneously if the group con-
tains adult members of both cultures who are salient entities and whose skills could be 
emulated out of a desire to be like ‘individual X.’ Researchers living within this milieu 
experience the culture first hand as recipients of culturally instantiated actions, agree-
ments, norms and processes across significant dimensions of time as well as across 
those important cultural perturbations which result from each birth, each death, each 
instance of serious injury and each significant socio-political realignment. Participant 
observers, through the embodiment of such experiences, become enabled to describe 
them in a manner traditionally employed by ethnologists to describe the foreign cul-
tures that they have adopted.  
 Through the living of a joined life, one learns about shared emotions, shared inten-
tions, shared goals, shared perceptions of time, shared ethical norms, shared health 
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and shared illness, and shared mythologies, among many other culturally instantiated 
ways of being. These shared perceptions of reality serve as sort of clay from which the 
events of daily living become co-molded and co-interpreted. Experiential knowledge 
of these events becomes verifiable through simple daily acts of joint living and joint 
engagement. This happens as it does because if perceptions emerge that prove to be 
inaccurate, nearly all attempted joint actions will fail. Thus there exists an inherent ‘cultural 
correction device’ which acts as an automatic constraint preventing incorrect perceptions from com-
pounding themselves. This ‘cultural correction device’ insures that the interpretations 
given the actions of others inevitably contain a high degree of validity. 
 Life in a shared culture avoids the pitfalls inherent in trying to determine whether 
or not captive apes reared in zoos and research labs lacking operational kinship 
groups, do or do not have certain abilities. Upon becoming an accepted member of an 
activated Pan/Homo culture, one gains insight into the emotional, cognitive and mythi-
cal percepts that under gird a functioning culture. Even as one experiences these proc-
esses, detailed data gathering, classification, and constant hypothesis testing is 
necessary in order to provide some organizational schemas of the nearly overwhelm-
ing wealth of sensory and symbolic information that impinges upon and overloads 
ones senses day and night.  
 Cultural forces operate on the novice initiate at many levels, from the trappings of 
clothing and prized objects, to the functionality of language and symbol systems, to 
the mythological forces that coalesce the motivations and intentions of the group, to 
the actual cellular embodiment of the constant sensory bombardment. But having 
made the transition to ‘group member’ – which is a very difficult process in itself -- 
bestows upon the successful initiate certain abilities, rights and privileges. One can 
comment on the abilities, foibles and beliefs of others in the group because one now 
knows about their social constructions through joint engagement, not through sec-
ond-hand report or arbitrary artificial testing procedures. 
 In the accounts that follow we present snapshots drawn from a large compilation 
of ethnographic data that has been systematically knitted together across a period of 
seven years (Fields, in preparation). Each of the categories discussed herein is exem-
plified by examples drawn from this larger corpus, none stands as an isolated instance. 
Whilst the charge of ‘anecdotism’ may be attempted in order to discredit the validity 
of the experience of living in a Pan/Homo world, such charges will inevitably melt as 
the number of documented novel instances mounts. Additionally, thick description, 
accompanied by video verification as journals move toward on line video explication 
of behavioral processes will place charges of ‘anecdotism’ squarely out of bounds. For 
an example of the power of video explication of linguistic processes, see Savage-
Rumbaugh, Fields, and Spricu, 2005. 
2. The Pan/Homo Culture: An Ethnographic Snapshot 
A notable difference between our work and that of more traditional ethnographers is 
that our Pan/Homo culture has been formed in collaboration with our research sub-
jects. Moreover, we employ the terms Pan and Homo loosely. They refer to a particular 
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culture found among wild bonobos and to a particular culture found among humans. 
It happens that these different cultures currently coalesce with different anatomical 
forms, but we do not take this situation to be immutable. Both Pan and Homo biolo-
gies are capable of instantiating many cultural forms other than those we are investi-
gating. Our work does not speak to the biologies, but rather to the processes whereby 
cultures interweave themselves into biologies. 
 For more than three decades a group of bonobos has been intentionally initiated 
into aspects of human culture by humans who live, eat, sleep, travel, speak and inter-
act with them during continuous and direct physical inter-action in an environment as 
free from cages as law will permit. These interactions are not that those typify most 
human/ape encounters. Thus these individuals are not treated in accordance with the 
common view of ‘ape as a creature less than human’ but rather as entities whose po-
tential is vast and unrecognized by our current limited views. Equally central is the fact 
that, by experiment choice, human culture has not been one-sidedly imposed. Rather, 
an intermediary culture with both Pan and Homo features has emerged by design in the 
interplay between apes and humans. This culture has operated upon, and changed 
both species, moving them toward a new norm.  
 These interactions take place within a matrix of travel. Movement through space as 
a group is critical to nearly all animal species and certainly to nonhuman primates. 
Even though Homo has evolved home basis, travel remains a central part of the lives 
of even modern humans many of whom have no need to travel in order to survive. 
Shared journeys, shared companions, shared sleeping arrangements and shared food 
are essential ingredients of our Pan/Homo. To the extent we are prevented from shar-
ing these basic actions of social living, we function less as a common culture and more 
as a set of independent beings, each with their own agenda and views. The shared per-
ception of potential danger, novelty and surprise during travel is also a important 
component of group cohesion, and a means of establishing a shared history and 
common perspective on that history. In our environment, canine species also play an 
important role. They establish particular bonds with different bonobos and behave 
protectively toward the bonobos by moving ahead in the forest and keeping watch for 
snakes, foxes, bears and panthers and wild dogs that occasionally are seen there. 
 These bonobos share a common vocal information system that is not innate, but 
culturally acquired (Taglialatela, 2004) and a written system, also culturally acquired. 
Their skills in these domains vary according to age and length of time in the 
Pan/Homo cultural world. All humans in the environment share common vocal and 
writing systems and to some extent humans have become able to interpret aspects of 
the bonobo vocal system. The degree to which either species can acquire the vocal 
system of the other appears to vary with initial age of exposure, length of exposure 
and type of exposure (Taglialatela, Savage-Rumbaugh, Baker, 2003; Taglialatela, 2004). 
Vocal communication between bonobos is extensive and ranges from specific infor-
mation about the environment (for example, someone is on a telephone pole outside, 
visitors are here, chow is being brought to the building) to laughter and screaming 
(Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, and Spircu, 2004).  
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 All bonobos in this environment are treated as sentient entities with varying de-
grees of human linguistic abilities and varying degrees of bonobo linguistic abilities. 
All were born at the Language Research Center (LRC) except for Matata and P-Suke 
who were wild caught in the late 1970’s and 80’s. Matata was captured just prior to 
puberty, thus unlike most captive wild-caught bonobos who are infants, Matata was 
able to learn nearly all aspects of her bonobo ways of life before coming to the United 
States. P-Suke, like many captive apes, was taken as an infant, and raised in a human 
home and later alone in a zoo for many years. Kanzi, Panbanisha, Nyota, Nathan, 
Maisha, and Elikya are the children and grandchildren of Matata.  
 The LRC is a beautiful and natural place consisting of a variety of venues nestled 
within in a 55-acre forest located on the periphery of a 300-acre riverine preserve 
where the South River flows. Culturally, each bonobo’s interpretation of the world re-
flects his or her rearing circumstances. Bonobo Matata and human Sue represent the 
bipolar matriarchy that has created the dynamic of the Pan/Homo continuum. Based 
upon each bonobo’s post natal ontogeny and cultural expression, we place these 
bonobos thusly: 
 
Wild Bonobo <-> Pan/Homo <-> Pan/Homo <->  Pan/Homo   <->   Human
Matata Elykia Kanzi Panbanisha, Nyota*  Sue 
Maisha Nathan* Nathan*       Bill 
(Bosondjo) P-Suke*        Liz 
          Dan, etc. 
  
 Matata represents a version of wild bonobo culture as Sue represents Midwestern 
North American human culture. Kanzi was bi-species mothered. Panbanisha grew up 
with a human mother within a functional bi-species group, Nyota is growing up with 
two human parents within an extended bonobo family; and Maisha was mothered by 
Matata. Elykia was mothered by Matata, with intermittent human mothering, Nathan 
is being raised by Panbanisha and a human mother (Both P-Suke and Kanzi play a fa-
therly role with all of the children.) Bosondjo is the father of Kanzi and Panbanisha. 
He was part of the initial group for several years, but was later relocated to Florida at 
the direction of the Yerkes Primate Center and the American Zoological Association.  
 These rearing differentials significantly inform the manner in which each individual 
learns, knows, believes, hopes, intends, and thinks, yet there are striking differences in 
how they learn and to the degree to which what they know can be linguistically modi-
fied. The power of language lies in our ability to employ it to attract the attention of 
others to our perception of reality. The degree to which language functions in this 
manner among the bonobos varies in association with the extent and form of expo-
sure to human culture early in life. 
3. Imitation 
An important cognitive capacity emerging in apes who are enculturated in humanlike 
but bi-species cultural environments is the ability to imitate human intentional actions. 
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According to Tomasello (Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh and Kruger, 1993), the early 
experience of human pedagogic practices transfers the uniquely human ability to see 
others as intentional agents to young bonobos (Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh & 
Kruger 1993). As a consequence, the LRC bonobos have developed the ability to imi-
tate actions as means/goal schemas (1999: 35). However, Tomasello also states that 
imitation is not defined as a cultural ability but is rather a cognitive prerequisite for the 
existence of culture. One may ask if Tomasello’s definition is consistent with his own 
assessment that LRC bonobos learned to imitate through their emersion in the 
Pan/Homo culture.  
Our hypothesis is that in order to recognize what a human experimenter is doing and to desire to imi-
tate his or her actions, it is necessary that the bonobo share essential aspects of culture with the indi-
vidual to be emulated. 
Kanzi began to flake stone after observing Dr. Nicholas Toth 
Kanzi’s ability to flake and fashion stone tools is well documented by NHK of Japan 
(see Kanzi II, 2000, video documentary.) Kanzi makes fine Oldwan type cutting knives 
from a variety of stone materials. He learned to do this by observing the archeologist 
Dr. Nicholas Toth. Nick showed Kanzi what to do in a single encounter and after a 
few brief demonstrations, Kanzi began to utilize a rock as cutting edge. He tested dif-
ferent flakes for sharpness and easily chose the best one. He attempted to knap with-
out success. But he continued to attempt what he had seen Nick do, long after Nick 
left. Kanzi’s first flake was not produced for several months and a number of years 
were required before he was able to perfect his technique. Similar amounts of time 
have been required for some adult human subjects to become equally adept. 
P-Suke’s inability to flake stone 
We have tried to teach P-Suke how to make rock tools on many occasions. Yet P-
Suke will only hold the rocks, he will not even attempt to percuss. P-Suke’s lack of wi-
llingness to participate in the use of cultural artifacts extends not only to rock tools, 
but to many simpler things. For example, the bonobos enter and exit the building by 
pressing a button to operate an automatic door. P-Suke refuses to press this button. 
He certainly can see what the button does, and he wants to open the door, but he will 
not do so. The other bonobos must open the door for him and they always do so, un-
less they are upset with him. 
 On the other hand, some artifacts of human culture are readily adopted by P-suke. 
He has, after a single demonstration, adopted the wearing of a mask and employed it 
in pretend games of scare and chase with youngsters. He has also noted the kinds of 
salves that are used for wounds and after a single demonstration has self-medicated 
his own injuries. He knows how cars work and like Kanzi and Panbanisha, he happily 
bounds into one to take a ride, while no amount of coxing can induce Matata into a 
large metal vehicle that moves. 
 When P-Suke arrived at the laboratory he was essentially silent except for nonlin-
guistic sounds, such as screams and laughs. Across the past eight years, he has ac-
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quired nearly the full bonobo vocal stream of communication, including emulations of 
English-like phrases employed by Kanzi. He is able to emulate Kanzi so well, that at 
times it becomes difficult to tell which one is vocalizing if they are both out of sight. 
Five year old Nyota spontaneously explicates his knowledge about flaking stone 
One day, after about two hours of attempting to encourage P-Suke to learn to flake 
stone, we let Nyota join P-suke. Nyota had been observing all from the back room. 
Five year old Nyota ran out to the tool making area, picked up two pieces of flint, 
knocked them together, and then simulated a small piece of flint flying in the air to 
represent a liberated chip. While Nyota was much too young to have the strength to 
actually make a stone tool, he knew the rules and he was anxious to demonstrate them 
for us on P-Suke’s behalf. In Nyota’s case, no one has ever tried to formally teach him 
about stone tool making. He acquired what he knows through watching Kanzi, Pan-
banisha, Bill and Sue make stone tools. As early as six months of age, when Nyota was 
watching Panbanisha make stone tools, he would emulate her actions by making a 
flailing motion in the air with his right arm while closely watching his mother as she 
flaked. 
4. Theory of mind  
Povinelli, maintains that when evolution installed theory of mind in Homo, humans 
began interpreting other animal species as if they too had theory of mind (Povinelli & 
Vonk 2003). According to this view humans are biologically determined to over-
interpret the cognitive capacities of non-human primates. Humans and chimpanzees 
share much behaviour, e.g., gaze following: if an experimenter looks up in the sky, the 
chimpanzee typically does so too. Because humans are equipped biologically with the-
ory of mind, Povinelli reasons, even scientifically trained experimenters instinctively 
over-interpret the chimpanzee’s looking reaction as though it were caused by aware-
ness that the human is ‘seeing something.’ According to Povinelli, 2000), interpreta-
tions such as these are imbued with problems, as the concept of mind is an a priori 
category in humans. We apply the concept automatically, even when we are acting sci-
entists who wish to test to determine if chimpanzees have theory of mind. Therefore, 
Povinelli concludes most scientists (other than himself) are likely to be incapable of 
seeing that apes are not like human beings with regard to even their most basic cogni-
tive schemas. 
 Povinelli’s view is supported by laboratory tests which demonstrate that chimpan-
zees lack the capacity for theory of mind. Normal human children pass these same 
tests at about four years of age (Povinelli 2000, Call and Tomasello 1999). However, 
we found that our human-enculturated bonobos pass linguistically mediated theory-
of-mind tests (Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields & Taglialatela 2001) with alacrity, utilizing 
linguistically encoded information.  
ToM in natural dialogue 
One day, Bill found fresh blueberries in the refrigerator and gave the entire package to 
Kanzi. Nyota knew that Kanzi ate all the fresh Blueberries yesterday and that Bill did 
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not give him any. He also knew that Bill knew this and he expressed it by stating 
“BLUEBERRIES YESTERDAY” while looking toward Kanzi, then looking expec-
tantly at Bill and stating “BLUEBERRIES GRAPES TODAY?” Nyota knew that Bill 
generally shares the blueberries, especially with himself and Panbanisha, as blueberries 
are Nyota’s most favorite fruit. All Nyota has to do to emphasize that he was not trea-
ted as fairly as he should have been yesterday is to express himself at the keyboard and 
Bill will quickly grasp the problem. Only Nyota employs the terms ‘yesterday’ and ‘to-
day’, but Kanzi and Panbanisha readily grasp their meaning.  
 Nyota can be even more explicit when he knows he knows something that Bill 
does not know. For example, Bill’s solution to Nyota’ request for “BLUEBERRIES 
TODAY” was to look in the freezer and offer frozen blueberries, Nyota responded 
with an emphatic, “NO ICE.” Bill was perplexed because he didn’t have any fresh 
blueberries and told Nyota, “I’m sorry but I don’t have any fresh blueberries. They are 
all gone.” Nyota responded, “CHILDSIDE CHILDSIDE, CHILDSIDE 
CHIDLSIDE.” –another location within the building, where bonobos are not permit-
ted to go. Bill was sure there were no blueberries on Childside because earlier he had 
come from Childside. It was Saturday, and he was the only one at the lab. Nyota re-
sponded “SUE.” “Sue’s on Childside?” “TALK TALK TALK SUE NOW.” You 
want me to call Sue on the telephone. “Peep-yes.” At that point Bill called Sue, and 
she indicated that she had asked someone to go to the store and get fresh blueberries 
and that she didn’t know if this person was back yet. Bill walked around to the Child-
side and found that someone had just gotten back from the store and was unloading 
the car. On the table in the childside grouproom was five pints of fresh blueberries. 
Later Sue explained that she had spent the night with Nyota had he had asked for 
blueberries so she had ordered them for him. 
Kanzi expresses displeasure when a promise is overlooked 
The first time this level of skill became unambiguously clear was when a video was 
made of Sue promising to bring Kanzi something for his seventh birthday when she 
returned to the lab the following day or ‘tomorrow’ as she emphasized to Kanzi. The 
tape was then shown to Kanzi. Upon entering the lab the following day, Sue at first 
forgot her promise. Kanzi began to display at her over and over and would not stop, a 
most singular event. Every attempt to calm Kanzi down and asked him was wrong on-
ly provoked him further. Every question about why he was being ‘bad’ resulted in mo-
re vigorous and aggressive displays. Finally Sue left the room.  
 Away from Kanzi and able to reflect, Sue suddenly recalled her promise of the 
previous day. She called out to Kanzi who was in the other room: ”Are you mad be-
cause I forgot your birthday?” Kanzi immediately respond with a cascade of vigor-
ously agreeing vocal explosions. As soon as Sue apologized and told Kanzi she would 
not forget and that she would bring his presents, he immediately burst into joy and 
not another display was seen. There could be little doubt that Kanzi remembered what 
had been promised to him the day before on the video. No attempt to cover this fact, 
no offer of preferred food, no offer of kindness, no stern words, nothing could erase 
this fact from his knowledge. Only recognition of the error and profession of eager-
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ness to correct the problem changed this situation. These and other similar events be-
come the self-imposed ‘experiments’ defined through daily living within the Pan/Homo 
culture.  
 One might ask, why did Kanzi not simply remind Sue of her promise. Certainly 
Kanzi has done exactly this on many occasions. On this day it appeared that Kanzi 
thought Sue’s action was deliberate. 
Panbanisha reminds Bill his glasses are on the washing machine because he cannot see the keyboard 
In another instance, Bill was fixing lunch and Panbanisha was using an old non-talking 
keyboard to tell him something. Bill feeling rushed and busy responded, “Panbanisha, 
I can’t see what your saying. Please use the talking keyboard.” Panbanisha knocked on 
the glass and signaled for him to come over to her. As Bill approached, she held the 
keyboard out so Bill could see it clearly and uttered “GRAB” and then pointed to his 
glasses on the washing machine. The clear implication is, of course, you cannot see 
because you don’t have you glasses on. Then Panbanisha uttered “KEYBOARD.” Bill 
could immediately see he had not turned the keyboard on so that it would talk. 
Panbanisha helps Bill remember what he has forgotten to do 
One night Bill was putting the bonobos to bed. At that time, a very special orangutan 
Mari, shared the Pan/Homo culture as a peripheral member.. Mari loved to be outside 
and when nightfall came she insisted on sleeping outdoors; however, generally she 
would come inside briefly to have supper with the bonobos. On this night she did not 
come in and the bonobos had supper without her. Bill was giving the bonobos their 
blankets when Panbanisha interrupted and uttered, “MARI BLANKETS JUICE.” Bill 
had completely forgotten about Mari because she was outside. Fortunately, Panbani-
sha reminded him. He immediately went outside and took Mari some blankets and 
juice.  
5. Language 
In contrast to the chimpanzee Nim, who was language-tutored in a specifically de-
signed classroom five days a week for five to six hours a day (Terrace 1979: 46-50, 56), 
the LRC bonobos acquired language freely in an unbound fashion lacking intentional 
tutoring of any sort. This fact corresponds well with observations emphasized by 
Chomsky (1959, 2000), namely, that children acquire language without systematic lin-
guistic instruction or correction: but effortlessly and spontaneously as an aspect of 
maturation. Chomsky and others interpret these observations as evidence for an in-
nate and uniquely human language faculty (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002). How-
ever, the LRC bonobos cause us to conclude that these central observations are not so 
much evidence for an innate and uniquely human universal grammar, as they are indi-
cations that cultural dimensions of language, often downplayed as extra-linguistic or 
contextual features, are the central pathway into language proper. 
 A new concept of language is mandated by these findings. Consequently we have 
revised Charles Hockett’s (1963) classical catalogue of the design features of language 
to incorporate the cultural dimensions of daily exchange in which the LRC bonobos’ 
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language emerged. The focus of the new catalogue is upon how language becomes 
stimulated to function in daily interplay between humans and bonobos in Pan/Homo-
life situations. The catalogue tabulates twelve design features: (i) spontaneity, (ii) 
boundlessness, (iii) immanence, (iv) cultural creativity and generality, (v) placement, 
(vi) gestures and tools, (vii) culture-sustained vocal speech and other media, (viii) cul-
tural unity, (ix) non-arbitrariness, (x) reflexivity, (xi) flexible interface of primate reac-
tions, and (xii)the moral and personal dimension of language. In contrast to other 
studies that look at language from cultural perspectives (e.g., Duranti 2001, Tomasello 
2003), our hypothesis is that language is as an integral aspect of cultural practices; interlaced within 
the substrate of certain basic traits of human culture (cf. the language-game analogy, Wittgenstein 
1953).  
Matata’s language 
The fact that Matata and Maisha have some linguistic abilities, even though they are 
are not yet self-evident to Homo beings, is evidenced by the tendency of Kanzi and 
Panbanisha to translate for Matata when she cannot make her wishes known. Panban-
isha regularly tells Sue which foods Matata wants to eat and which doors Matata is 
asking to have opened. Kanzi makes clear P-suke’s needs, and when Kanzi does not 
succeed in getting them across P-suke displays, at everyone. Nyota often speaks for 
Nathan and Elykia.  
 Sometimes Matata provides very specific information to Kanzi and Panbanisha. 
For example, one day when everyone was quiet Matata, who was located 200 yards 
away in another building, began to vocalize. Kanzi did not answer her by looked to-
ward her direction. Sue asked “What is Matata talking about?” Kanzi answered 
“CHOW.” Sue thought maybe Kanzi was mistaken however she phoned the building 
where Matata was located to ask what was happening she was told that someone was 
just walking in the door with a bag of chow. 
 On another occasion, Matata’s vocalization from far away suddenly set Kanzi to 
climbing as high as could inside the building to look out of the monitors in a specific 
direction. When Sue sent someone to find out what was there, they found a man up in 
a telephone pole.  
 We find it difficult not to suspect that Matata came to the United States equipped 
with a language of some form, though it is not the same kind of language that Kanzi 
and Panbanisha and Nyota have acquired. Matata is able to express needs, wants and 
events of general interest (for example, there is a man on the telephone pole), but she 
does not appear to engage in self-reflection. It is a though she speaks a language lack-
ing the personal pronouns I, he, she, it, they, we etc, and a language lacking past tense.  
 Kanzi and Panbanisha appear to be cognizant of this discrepancy for there are 
many things they will, upon our request to “Tell Matata X,” quickly translate for 
Matata. These include things such as “Visitors are coming, Chow is here, The gorilla is 
in the forest, Someone is getting in trouble, We are doing good, We are coming to see 
you, Kanzi did a good job, We are having bananas, Panbanisha is happy, etc.” Like-
wise there are many things that they understand but refuse to translate upon request. 
These include things like “It is raining outdoors, Sue thinks that you should tell Mai-
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sha to be good, If you go into the middle test room and let Sue shut the door, she can 
move Kanzi into the third cage. You need to let us lock you outdoors because the re-
pair man is coming. This ball is red. The bottle of juice is big. Sue is taller than Liz. Liz 
is going to go to the childside to talk to Bill about her schedule. Holly will wash the 
dishes later. We saw a panther last here last week, etc. 
 Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota are able to talk about things present, in the past, and 
of the future. As far as we can detect, Matata, Maisha and Elikya do not do this, or at 
least they do not do so with humans. Matata is able to communicate about things pre-
sent to Kanzi and Panbanisha. For example, on one occasion, Matata was very upset 
as she called out in usual sounds. Sue and Panbanisha were in another building where 
they could hear Matata calling and Kanzi answering. Sue asked Panbanisha, “What are 
Matata and Kanzi talking about?” Panbanisha responded “DOGS.” Sue inquired fur-
ther, “What dogs?” And Panbanisha replied, “BAD DOGS CRISCROSS 
CORNERS.” A staff member was sent into the woods to determine if this was so. It 
was, there were five to six wild dogs at Lookout Point, a location very close to Criss-
cross Corners. Wild dogs seasonally come and go as they move up the river hunting 
for deer.  
Beliefs about Good and Bad 
Let us take for purposes of example, a piece of knowledge and belief about good and 
bad that exists in the Pan/Homo culture. Kanzi and his family have grown up with the 
mythical characters Bunny and Gorilla. Bunny is a kind entity who protects the bono-
bos. Bunny never does anything bad and always brings wonderful surprises for the 
bonobos. Gorilla lives on the edge of our forest and has a reputation for stealing food 
and prized objects. Kanzi is quite afraid of Gorilla and this invented boogieman has 
served us well in limiting how far Kanzi is willing to venture into the forest. Kanzi be-
lieves that if he goes too far, such as over the fence into the subdivision, Gorilla will 
be waiting. Bunny and Gorilla are costumes which the lab employees put on and per-
form the mythological moment. When Kanzi became an adult, Sue introduced Gorilla 
as a costume to Kanzi. She let him try on the Gorilla costume. Then Sue put on the 
costume. Kanzi knew Sue was in the costume, but there were limits to how far his be-
liefs could be modified. While Kanzi would tolerate Sue in the Gorilla costume, it was 
clear that in Kanzi’s mind, he was not sure to what degree the costume would affect 
Sue’s behavior towards him.  
 As long as Sue does not wear the costume too long, she will be treated as ‘Sue,’ but 
if she continues to wear it and to behave as the gorilla, she begins (in Kanzi’s percep-
tion) to loose her role and status as a member of the Pan/Homo culture and to become 
an outsider. This is dangerous to Sue for outsiders can be subject to serious attack 
without cause, whereas as accepted members of the culture are subject to serious at-
tack only if they intentionally and deliberately violate cultural conventions.  
 Unlike Kanzi, Panbanisha believes that Sue will always be Sue regardless of the go-
rilla costume and she is not afraid at all. She knows that the donning of the costume is 
a game and she will often initiate a request for this game and specify who is to be ‘sca-
red’ by the gorilla, how the gorilla is to go about accomplishing this action, and where 
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where to gorilla is to go. Lab employees such as the secretary enjoy participating in the 
game and pretend to be scared. Panbanisha is always watching them very closely to try 
and determine whether or not they are really frightened. 
 Nyota offers a very interesting surprise in his behavior. Nyota views the gorilla 
costume as “NO PRETEND.” Nyota cannot imagine the gorilla costume would scare 
anybody because it is plastic and fake. He believes if you want to scare a person, hu-
man or nonhuman, get a real snake and chase them with it.  
 An example of the way in which these differences in belief and knowledge operate 
could be seen the first time a nearly unimaginable event happened. The ‘gorilla’ (Sue 
in costume) approached the laboratory carrying Nyota! Never had the gorilla actually 
touched a bonobo before. Panbanisha watched, intrigued at this event, but not the 
least upset. Kanzi, hair standing out all over his body, ran to keyboard to announced 
to Bill, ”NYOTA GORILLA!!!” He then gestured for Bill to go out and do something 
about the fact that the gorilla had stolen Nyota.  
A Pan/Homo debate: Sue and Panbanisha disagree 
A second example of cultural cognition deals with hope, expectation, and planning. 
While we have evidence that all bonobos plan and possess expectations, such situa-
tions are much more difficult to document with Matata than with Panbanisha, Kanzi 
or Nyota. Indeed Panbanisha is able to provide us with examples of planning, expec-
tation, and hope essentially everyday. One example, documented on video, occurred 
as the sun was going down, and NHK was filming the bonobos. Sue was trying to fa-
cilitate an event where Panbanisha would go to spend some time with her bonobo 
mother Matata who was staying in other building about 200 yards away (the ‘P-Suke’ 
building). Panbanisha has been inside all day long and wanted instead to go walking in 
the woods with Sue, regardless of the fact that it was late and almost dark. Sue began 
to discuss her plan with Panbanisha. It was clear Panbanisha did not want to go see 
Matata. She suggested that she and Sue go to Sue’s Gate, Scrubby Pine Nook, or Loo-
kout Point, anyplace but to see Matata. Sue insisted they go see Matata. Both Sue and 
Panbanisha maintained their views and a human/nonhuman argument was explicated 
upon the lexigram keyboard before the camera that lasted thirty minutes. Sue was 
exasperated. Panbanisha was not willing to cooperate. Finally Sue said, “Panbanisha, 
this is serious. You have two choices. You can either go to the P-Suke building to see 
Matata or you can go back to the colony room with Kanzi.” Panbanisha thought for a 
very long moment and then with a stern look on her face turned and walked back to 
the colony room. Clearly, she had comprehended Sue’s linguistically expressed plan 
and offered Sue many alternatives, but when Sue would not accept any of them, she 
likewise would not accept Sue’s plan. 
Bill talks to Panbanisha about her feelings after arguing with Sue 
After the discussion noted above between Sue and Panbanisha Bill asked Panbanisha 
how she was feeling about not going out with Sue and she responded, “MAD.” Bill 
told her he was sorry and that perhaps tomorrow they might go to Camper Cabin and 
Midway. Panbanisha responded, “CAMPER CABIN LATER.” Bill said, “Yes, later.” 
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Bill did not see Panbanisha the next day. About a week later, Panbanisha reminded 
him, “CAMPER CABIN LATER.” Bill said, “Oh Panbanisha, I’m so sorry, I forgot. 
Let me go talk to Sue.” Panbanisha stopped him and also uttered “EGGS LATER.” 
Eggs are the traditional food associated with Camper Cabin. Panbanisha was making 
sure that if she got to go out, that Bill would have the forest baited with food. And if 
she didn’t go, that Bill would arrange for the bonobos to have eggs that night. As it 
turned out, no one was able to go out that day because it rained, but Bill got the eggs 
for dinner. That night Panbanisha remembered and asked for the eggs and all the bo-
nobos had some. Then Bill asked Panbanisha how she felt and she responded, “TV-
TAPE, BLANKETS, BANANA.” Bill understood that Panbanisha was ignoring his 
question and that she wanted him to get a videotape and put it in the television, find 
some more blankets, and some bananas before he left. But Bill wanted to know how 
Panbanisha felt. He persisted by asking, “Are you still my friend?” She responded 
“GOOD” and pressed up against Bill. Being very happy that he was forgiven for for-
getting his promise, Bill provided Panbanisha her requests and said goodnight. 
6. Conclusion 
Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota are significantly changed by the ontogeny of their hu-
man enculturation. P-Suke seems to be as well, but this is only emerging in his case, as 
he arrived at the laboratory with knowledge of Japanese, but no English, lexical or 
bonobo comprehension skills. With each new generation after Matata, the Pan babies 
of human cultural bias begin to gaze, think, gesture and behave in nonverbal ways that 
increasingly diverge from Matata. Yet they remain fully capable of socializing normally 
with other members of Pan.  
 Lacking a language of self-reflection, but possessing a language of ideation and co-
construction of dialogic representation, Matata lives in world that is both within 
bounds and yet out of bounds to Kanzi and Panbanisha and the other members of the 
Pan/Homo culture. The contrasts between Matata and Kanzi stands as a striking ex-
ample of the fact that tests such as those offered by Premack (2002), Tomasello (1999, 
2001) and Povinelli (2000) tap culturally instantiated realities, not biological limita-
tions.  
 Other investigators interested ape cognition retain the option to act as observer-
recorders and/or presenters of test materials. Through such techniques, they assume 
the luxury of engaging in interpretations that may or may not prove valid. By contrast 
the cultural actions of participants are real and have real consequences, some of which 
can be and have been dangerous. Our actions within the culture stand as part and par-
cel of the set of discernable facts.  
 In light of the data presented here and elsewhere since 1975, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
those scientists who wish to develop theoretical perspectives regarding the limits of ape cognition -- while 
remaining outside the circle of insights that arise upon authentic cultural engagement -- must now jus-
tify the means by which they may assert such intellectual privilege.  
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 As other researchers move to replicate the Pan/Homo culture of the LRC bonobos, 
they should be cognizant of the critical role played by Matata (and initially by Bos-
ondjo). The Pan/Homo culture began with Sue spending years integrating herself into 
the bonobo culture of Matata, Lokelema and Bosondjo within the first few months of 
their importation to the United States in 1975. Experience in integrating herself for 
five years into a group of chimpanzees prepared her for this venture. It was with Kan-
zi’s birth that the human influence began. If Sue had not integrated herself fully into 
the bonobo culture she would not have been permitted to assist Matata with Kanzi’s 
care and rearing. The polarity that emerged between Matata’s rearing patterns and 
Sue’s manifest itself initially in the fact that Sue carried Kanzi bipedally and Matata ca-
rried him quadrupedally. When Sue held Kanzi she supported his weight. When he 
rode with Matata on their long walks in the forest, he had to support himself. Thus 
with Sue he was free to look ahead and to manipulate all manner of things with his 
hands as he walked. With Matata, he had to attend to clinging and saw only the 
rushing panoply of green as they traversed the forest. This simple difference ex-
perienced by Kanzi as he rode first with Sue and then with Matata (whichever he 
chose) set the stage for the cultural bifurcation and polar tension that has created the 
Pan/Homo culture. This tension itself serves as creative and positive force. Without it, 
Kanzi would have experienced only “human rearing” and we suspect, would not have 
been stimulated sufficiently to develop many aspect of cognitive competence that he 
now manifests. 
 Are there limitations to great ape cognition that are not culturally based? Is brain 
size and/or brain wiring a basic constraint in some yet unexplained way? We know 
that human children who suffer hemispherectomies at an early age still acquire lan-
guage and human culture. Apart from difficulties in locomotion and some minor cog-
nitive deficits these individual do not differ appreciably from normal children, even 
though their brains are half the normal size and clearly must become differently wired. 
These simple facts point us in a new direction of self-understanding and awareness. 
They emphasize the strength of cultural realities, cultural bias and the myopic focus of 
the current theoretical constructions of mind. Minds do not arrive preformed and 
minds do not emerge in precise stages. Minds are bended and folded by culture forces 
that are operating at a level that we are only beginning to understand. 
 Certainly the coordination of gestures and glances among parents and offspring 
that arise in the matrix of dialogic reality co-construction, play a role in the develop-
ment of mind, but these events, which typically operate ‘off-line’ as non-conscious 
nonverbal co-coordinators in the dance of behavioral interchange (King, Shanker and 
King, Greenspan and Shanker) are not the driving forces of dialogic competency. 
They are too intricate, too rapid and too unconscious to begin to be the carriers of 
conscious reality. They are its manifestations, but not its structural units. The plasticity 
of the nervous system is the matrix upon which culture forces operate and propagate 
themselves. They control its shape and its potential through physical dynamics yet to 
be explicated. 
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 Though we do not yet fully understand how cultures transmit knowledge, what we 
have acquired from the LRC bonobos has far reaching implications for our under-
standing of the relation between human biology and culture. We are forced to ac-
knowledge that skills we have assumed to be fundamental to all aspects of human 
cognition (i.e. language, imitation and ‘theory of mind’) are not innate. They emerge 
within a cultural environment that has been constructed of whole cloth across millen-
nia of social weaving. Whether we approve or not, we are products of the very cul-
tures we ourselves have, in co-constructed dialogic exchanges, brought into being. 
These cultural forces act anew on each generation, perpetuating themselves with regu-
larity so profound that we have assumed our rational thought processes to be innate. 
The LRC bonobos reveal that our species, like these bonobos themselves, must pos-
sess a vast and unrecognized potential to alter the most fundamental aspects of our 
cognitions. 
 To conclude that the bonobos would not have gained their competencies without 
human input is foolish. Even Kanzi’s own experiences in becoming an excellent 
knapper suggest that the changes are hewn from the fabric of engagement. Kanzi’s af-
fair with stone has changed the structure of his musculature and wiring of his brain, 
for it takes two hands, operating simultaneously but nonsymmetrically, to produce 
stone flakes. Kanzi did not change simply by watching us. He changed through the 
physicality of knapping. P-Suke lacks Kanzi’s physical and mental knapping anatomy 
as he has not changed through the physicality of a knapping engagement.  
 What happens in the engagement of physicality with stone technology is intriguing 
and set Homo on a unique course. However what can happen in the far more dynamic 
realm of the physicality of social interchange is as yet unknown, but fundamental 
change at this level as the potential to lead to completely new behavioral worlds, social 
worlds that we have not previously constructed through any extant culture. 
 
TABLE 1 
Individual Sex Age Place of Birth Cultural Mothering 
Matata F >35 Congo, Africa Wild Bonobo/taken at puberty  
P-Suke M >30 Congo, Africa Wild Bonobo/taken as infant reared in 
human family as an ‘ape’ -- language com-
prehension and enculturation is Japanese 
Elikya F 8 Decatur, Georgia Wild Caught Captive Bonobo Mother 
Maisha M 3 Decatur, Georgia Wild Caught Captive Bonobo Mother 
Kanzi M 25 Yerkes Wild CaughtBonobo Mother and Huuman 
Mothers 
Panbanisha F 19 Decatur, Georgia Human Mother  
Nyota M 6 Decatur, Georgia Human Mother and Human Father and 
Human Enculturated Bonobo Mother  
Nathan M 3 Decatur, Georgia Human Enculturated Bonobo Mother 
And Human Mother 
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